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INTRODUCTION 
Respondents both failed to address the central issue in this case: the Federal Meat 
Inspection Act ("FMIA") establishes the standard of care for meat sales and production in Idaho. 
Patty Anderson and Don's Meats prepared and sold adulterated meat in violation of the Federal 
Meat Inspection Act, breaching their duty of care, and severely sickening the Plaintiffs. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANTS' NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS WERE PLED APPROPRIATELY. 
Respondent Don's Meats repeatedly suggests Appellants' failure to plead negligence per 
se separately is somehow dispositive. This issue was appropriately handled at the trial level. This 
appeal relates to Appellants' negligence cause of action. 1 
Idaho law is crystal clear: negligence per se is not a distinct cause of action from 
negligence. There is no requirement to distinctly plead negligence per se, and Defendants have 
cited no authority purporting to require as much. "Negligence per se is simply one manner of 
proving a common law negligence claim." Steed v. Grand Teton Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 
Inc., 144 Idaho 848, 853, 172 P.3d 1123, 1128 (2007), (citing Ahles v. Tabor, 136 Idaho 393, 34 
P.3d 1076(2001 )). In Idaho, "a party is not required to specifically plead negligence per se in their 
complaint when alleging a cause of action for ordinary negligence." Obendorf v. Terra Hug Spray 
Co., 145 Idaho 892, 898-99, 188 P.3d 834, 840-41 (2008). 
1 Respondent Don's Meats incorrectly suggests "the Deiters are not appealing the grant of 
summary judgment on the following claims: (1) negligence ... " (Respondents Don's Meats 
Opening Brief at 11 ). 
Moreover, "in Idaho, it is well established that statutes and administrative regulations may 
define the applicable standard of care owed, and that violations of such statutes and regulations 
may constitute negligence per se." Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609,617,733 P.2d 1234, 1242 
(1986). The trial court specifically addressed the applicability of the Federal Meat Inspection Act 
(FMIA) as determinative of the standard of care owed under Appellants' negligence claim. Though 
the lower court incorrectly failed to apply the FMIA's requirements as the standard of care, it 
properly declined to require a separate pleading for negligence per se. 
II. PATTY ANDERSON CONTRACTED TO SELL MEAT, NOT A LIVE STEER, 
SUBJECTING HER TO THE FMIA'S REQUIREMENTS. 
The core of Respondent Patty Anderson's argument on appeal is that, because the steer was 
alive at the time the contract was signed, none of the provisions of the Federal Meat Inspection 
Act apply to her actions. Specifically, she argues "the subject live steer was sold to the Deiters 
and Kirks at the time the contracts were signed by the parties and the deposit monies were provided 
to Patty Anderson." Her analysis reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of contract law. 
The contract between Patty Anderson and Joseph Deiter, drafted by Ms. Anderson, reads 
as follows: 
This is a contract iniated [sic] on Aug. 14, 2010 
Between Patty A. Anderson and Joseph and Melinda Deiter of 1935 N Daulby St. 
Meridian, ID. 
A deposit of $100.00 (check #1178) has been received by Patty A. Anderson for 
½ of a beef in ( carcass weight). Once the beef has been killed and delivered to 
Don's Meat in Emmett, ID. the carcass weight will be known and Sharon Coons 
( owner of Don's Meat) will tell us that weight is. At that time Joseph and Melinda 
Deiter will pay me (Patty Anderson) the amount of $2.25 lb for ½ the beef. When 
2 
the meat has been cut + wrapped by Don's Meat Joseph and Melinda Deiter will 
pay Sharon Coons .45 ¢ lb for that service and will pick up their half of the beef. 
(R. p. 61). 
This is a bilateral contract. "A bilateral contract consists of mutual promises, made in 
exchange for each other by each of the two contracting parties ... In a bilateral contract both parties 
are promisors and both parties are promisees; and the legal effect of such a contract is that there 
are mutual rights and mutual duties." Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Turner Ins. Agency, Inc., 
96 Idaho 691,695,535 P.2d 664,668 (1975), citing l Corbin on Contracts 24, s 21 (rev. ed. 1963). 
Patty Anderson's promise or obligation under the Deiter contract was not to transfer a live 
steer to Joseph and Melinda Deiter. Instead, she obligated herself to have the animal "killed and 
delivered to Don's Meat," who would be paid separately for their cut and wrap service. Though 
the Deiters had given Ms. Anderson a $100.00 deposit, the contract was not yet performed by Ms. 
Anderson at the time Joseph Deiter signed on the line. The remainder was not due upon delivery 
of a living, breathing steer; the $2.25 per pound in carcass weight was due upon the Deiters' receipt 
of meat under the contract.2 Patty Anderson paid the kill fee out of her own pocket. Joseph Deiter 
purchased meat from Patty Anderson, not a live animal. 
2 Though not entitled to any level of judicial deference, even by Patty Anderson's source's own 
admission, if a person is "selling the animal when live; by the letter of the law, you should charge 
by the live weight." (Respondent Patty Anderson's Brief at 13, citing Gwin, Lauren and Jim 
Postlewait, Frequently asked questions about using custom-exempt slaughter and processing 
facilities in Oregon for beef, pork, lamb and goat, Oregon State University Extension Service 
(2009): beefcattle.ans.oregonstate.edu/html/publications/documents/BEEF006-F AQ_ 001.pdf). 
No affidavit or opinion is offered to authenticate such an article. It is not permissible to shirk the 
boundaries of the FMIA because an unverified individual in Oregon thinks it is "not practical" to 
weigh the animal before selling it. 
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To analogize, consider a situation where a buyer enters into a contract with a builder for a 
house, and offers a deposit as an assurance that the buyer will pay the full amount. Simply because 
the contract is entered into while the house is not yet built does not mean the buyer purchased 
timber and other raw materials rather than a completed home. 
Similarly, the contract between the Kirks reads: 
This contract commencing on 8-17-10 between Patty A. Anderson and Carolyn Kirk 
is for the purchase of½ of a angus beef. 
Received check# 2549 in the amount of $100.00 as deposit on beef. 
I agree to pay the kill fee to the mobile butcher. He will take the beef to Don's Meat 
in Emmett, ID. Don's Meat will determine the carcass weight. Don's Meat will 
notify both Carolyn and me of the carcass weight. When this is determined Carolyn 
Kirk agrees to mail me Patty Anderson the balance at $2.25 lb (carcass) weight). 
Don's Meat will notify Carolyn Kirk when the meat is ready to be picked up. 
Carolyn Kirk will pay Don's Meat .45 ¢lb.for cutting and wrapping the beef. 
Thank you. I'm sure you will enjoy your meat. Keep our phone number and contact 
us when you want more beef. 
(R. p. 63). 
The record contains no evidence of any cooperation between the Deiters and the Kirks 
regarding what to do with their live steer--even merely discussing logistics about how to slaughter 
and butcher it. There is no evidence because the contracts were for sales of meat, not a live animal. 
Patty Anderson insists that she "hired Janak, Inc., to slaughter the animal on behalf of the 
Deiters and Kirks, and to deliver the carcass to Don's Meats for the Deiters and the Kirks," (Brief 
of Respondent Patty Anderson at 1 7), and that she "told Janak, Inc. of the prior sale of the live 
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steer to the Deiters and Kirks. (Id. at 8). This is contrary to Donald Janak's own affidavit, which 
states Janak, Inc. "had no knowledge as to whether Anderson had sold the beef to anyone" and 
"had no way of knowing that the beef it was asked to slaughter was for anyone other than Patty 
Anderson." (R. p. 94). As such, when Janak delivered the carcass to Don's Meats at the behest of 
Ms. Anderson, he tagged it with her name as the owner. (R. p. 94). 
Finally, after the animal had been slaughtered and butchered, Anderson kept a whole box 
of meat for herself-further evidence that she sold meat, not a live animal. (Aug. R. Aff. of Stanley 
J. Tharp, April 22, 2013, Exh. D). 
As a matter of law, Patty Anderson's contractual obligation to provide "half a beef," 
measured in carcass weight, killed and delivered to a meat processor constitutes a sale of meat, not 
of an animal. Because Patty Anderson sold meat, her sale triggered the FMIA's provisions. 
Appellants' expert Kevin Elfering's report offers unrefuted information about just how the meat 
likely became adulterated before it was transferred to Don's Meats by Janak, Inc. (Aug. R. Aff. of 
Kevin Elfering). This adulteration occurred long before Patty Anderson had completed her 
contractual duty to have the steer killed and delivered to Don's Meats. Only after the carcass was 
tainted with fecal matter and E. coli O157:H7 could Patty Anderson collect her $2.25 per pound 
based on the adulterated carcass's weight. 
III. DON'S MEATS EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE FMIA'S CUSTOM 
EXEMPTION 
Don's Meats argues it did not violate the Federal Meat Inspection Act because it is entirely 
"exempt" from regulatory compliance. Don's Meats also takes issue with Appellants' citation of 
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21 U.S.C. § 661, claiming the provision was not raised below. Don's Meats violations of the FMIA 
were thoroughly briefed below. Don's Meat acted outside any custom exemption authorized by 
the FMIA. By violating the FMIA, Don's Meats breached its duty to Appellants. 
A. The Deiters do not raise the FMIA's application to Idaho for the first time on appeal. 
Don's Meats argues that the Deiters rely on 21 U.S.C. § 661 for the first time on appeal. 
(Respondent Don's Meats Opening Brief at 12, 19). Section 661 outlines mandatory state 
implementation of the FMIA or equal standards. The Deiters cited the entire Federal Meat 
Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695, in response to Don's Meat's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Don's Meats did not contend the FMIA did not apply in Idaho at the district court, 
leaving no reason to expound upon the implications of Section 661. 
In contrast to Don's Meats, Patty Anderson contemporaneously argued her conduct was 
not under the purview of the FMIA because it was not "in commerce." Before the trial court, 
Appellants cited specifically to 21 U.S.C. § 661 in their motion for reconsideration of the grant of 
summary judgment to Patty Anderson. (R. p. 577). Arguments made in a motion for 
reconsideration are considered "within the scope of the issues raised by the pleadings" for purposes 
of an appeal. Nelson v. Big Lost River Irrigation Dist., 148 Idaho 157, 160, 219 P.3d 804, 807 
(2009). 
Though Don's Meats did not raise an interstate commerce issue, it was the basis for the 
District Court's ruling (R. p. 603-605), and becomes necessary to address on appeal, both 
specifically and as more generally as the means by which the FMIA applies to states. The larger 
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issue of Respondents' negligent conduct in the sale and preparation of meat is hardly a new issue, 
and was extensively discussed at oral argument and in the pleadings. 
B. The FMIA's non-exempt provisions applied to Don's Meats actions. 
Despite the inescapable conclusion that the federal regulatory framework applies even to 
purely intrastate transactions in Idaho, Don's Meats also insists it was "exempt" from compliance 
with the FMIA. (Respondent Don's Meats Opening Brief at 24). The custom exemption is a 
narrowly-carved relief from inspection allowing processors to slaughter and/or prepare meat for 
those who raise the animal. 3 
First and foremost, the FMIA' s custom exemption does not relieve compliance with any 
adulteration or misbranding provisions: 
( d) Adulteration and misbranding provisions applicable to inspection-free 
articles 
The adulteration and misbranding provisions of this subchapter, other than the 
requirement of the inspection legend, shall apply to articles which are exempted 
from inspection or not required to be inspected under this section. 
21 U.S.C. § 623(d). Don's Meats receipt, further preparation, and sale of the meat in question-
which, according to Appellants' experts was already adulterated-violates adulteration and 
3 Respondent Don's Meats cites to the same Oregon State University Service on Custom-Exempt 
Slaughter Anderson does. Regardless, Don's Meats violated the very article it cited, by giving 
meat back to Patty Anderson from the slaughtered animal they claimed was clearly owned by the 
Respondents and the Kirks. 
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misbranding provisions from which Don's Meats cannot claim exemption. See 21 U.S.C. § 610 (a, 
c-d).4 It is unlawful to: 
sell, transport, offer for sale or transportation, or receive for transportation, in 
commerce, (1) any such articles which (A) are capable of use as human food and 
(B) are adulterated or misbranded at the time of such sale, transportation, offer for 
sale or transportation, or receipt for transportation; or (2) any articles required to be 
inspected under this subchapter unless they have been so inspected and passed ... 
21 U.S.C. § 610(b). Don's Meats argues it did nothing "in commerce," and therefore did not 
violate any provisions in its processing and packaging of the meat. But "commerce" here-by 
virtue of the Wholesome Meat Act's application of the Federal Meat Inspection Act to states like 
Idaho-refers also to wholly intrastate conduct. 
Don's Meat was also operating outside the FMIA's custom exemption by releasing meat 
from a private owner to the general public without the requisite inspections. Don's Meats persists 
that it "did not prepare any such articles for commerce," nor did it "sell, transport or offer for sale 
or transportation in commerce any such articles (i.e., meat)." (Respondent Don's Meats Opening 
Brief at 21). Don's Meats cannot plausibly argue that it did not prepare meat for commerce, 
especially after charging Joseph and Melinda Deiter a fee for its processing of Patty Anderson's 
carcass. 
Don's Meats attempt to mold their conduct into FMIA-compliance is irreconcilable with 
the belated assertion that Patty Anderson was "clearly" not the owner of the carcass delivered to 
4 To the extent Don's Meats may attempt to disagree with Appellants' experts, they have failed to 
produce expert testimony refuting those reports. Under the summary judgment standard, these 
facts must be taken in the light most favorable to the Deiters as non-movants. 
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Don's Meats. (Respondent Don's Meats Opening Brief at 22). Don Janak tagged the carcass with 
Patty Anderson's name. (R. p. 94). Don's Meats retained and delivered 1 box of meat to Patty 
Anderson from the carcass both Respondents argue belonged to the Kirks and Deiters. (Aug. R. 
Aff. of Stanley J. Tharp, April 22, 2013, Exh. D). 
Don's Meats suggests that the third of three custom exemptions applies here. In their words 
"the person who raised the steer may deliver the carcass to the custom preparer for preparation of 
the meat for use exclusively by the owner." (Respondent Don's Meats Opening Brief at 22). This, 
they suggest, is what happened here: "Anderson's granddaughter, who raised the steer, had it 
slaughtered by Defendant Don Janak and Delivered to Don's Meats, which prepared the meat for 
the exclusive use of the owners of the steer, the Deiters and the Kirks." (Respondent Don's Meats 
Opening Brief at 22). Even assuming those facts were true, that is not what the third clause of the 
custom exemption reads. 
Instead, the Act's provisions (except those relating to adulteration and misbranding) shall 
not apply to: "the custom preparation by any person, firm or corporation of carcasses, parts 
thereof, meat or meat food products, derived from the slaughter by any person of cattle, sheep, 
swine, or goats of his own raising... delivered by the owner thereof for such custom 
preparation ... " 21 U.S.C. § 623(a). In order for Don's Meats' actions to be custom exempt under 
this clause, the slaughterer must be the person who raised the animal in question. Danielle Bryant 
did not slaughter the steer. 
9 
Don's Meats accepted a mobile slaughtered carcass from Don Janak it knew belonged to 
Patty Anderson and processed the meat, releasing it to the Deiters, Kirks, and Anderson, 
effectively exiling itself from the custom exemption's safe harbor. There are simply too many links 
in the chain. Despite Don's Meats attempt to fashion facts in its favor by arguing the Deiters owned 
the live steer, they cannot meet the summary judgment burden. 
IV. APPELLANTS NEGLIGENCE PER SE CLAIM ARE NOT AN ATTEMPTED 
PRIVATE ACTION UNDER THE FMIA 
Respondents both contend Appellants claim a private right of action under the FMIA. They 
have never, and do not now. Instead of bringing a novel claim purporting to be a private cause of 
action under the FMIA, Appellants instead argue that the FMIA sets the appropriate standard of 
care for their state law negligence claims against Patty Anderson and Don's Meats. 
Respondents apparently argue that, because the FMIA does not create its own statutory 
cause of action, Appellants cannot recover for violations of the FMIA on a negligence per se theory 
properly supported by proximate causation and damages. Both cases cited by Don's Meats, Pacific 
Trading Co. v. Wilson & Co., 547 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1976), and Mario's Butcher Shop and Food 
Center, Inc. v. Armour and Co., 574 F.Supp. 653 (N.D. Ill. 1983), were suits plaintiffs attempted 
to bring under the FMIA itself, without alleging or arguing negligence per se, and do not apply 
here. Breach of a duty of care by violating federal regulations can result in actionable negligence 
per se in Idaho. See Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609 (1986). Respondents simply to do not seek 
any specific relief provided by the FMIA. This is a negligence claim for which the FMIA should 
replace the standard of care and breach elements. 
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V. PROXIMATE CAUSE IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
Don's Meats argues the Deiters have failed to establish proximate causation and summary 
judgement is appropriate. Summary judgment is appropriate only if the affidavits, depositions, 
admissions and other evidence in the record demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. l.R.C.P. 56( c ); Loomis 
v. City o.f Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 436, 807 P.2d 1272, 1274 (I 991). 
The legal responsibilities of Don's Meats and Patty Anderson are clear under the FMIA. 
The rules were not followed. 5 Appellants have provided admissible evidence via two septate expert 
affidavits, linking the meat in question to the illnesses. 
Dr. Medus stated: 
In my opinion, the contaminated beef purchased from Patty A. Anderson and Don's 
Wholesale Meats was the initial source of illness in the household. Since the family 
consumed the contaminated beefrepeatedly over a one week time period, all of the 
illnesses can be explained by ground beef consumption on multiple days. 
(Aug. R. Aff. of Carlota Medus, Ex.Bat 3-4). 
Dr. Elfering stated: 
In reviewing the microbiological data and the summation of Dr. Carlota Medus, the 
Deiter family became ill with E-coli 0157 :H7 from the consumption of the beef in 
question, slaughtered by Janak and Hicks, and sold to them by Patty Anderson. 
5 Respondent Don's Meats discusses at length its sanitation procedures and notes it has never been 
issued a USDA citation. (Respondent Don's Meats Opening Brief at 6). This is totally irrelevant 
to whether the meat purchased by the Deiters was adulterated with E.coli 0157:H7 and does not 
excuse Don's Meats instant non-compliance with FMIA regulations. 
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(Aug R. Aff. of Kevin Elfering, 
piece of admissible evidence. 
Bat 8 and 9.) Respondents have not rebutted this with a single 
Don's Meats suggests the Deiters "admit the meat was not contaminated with E. coli." 
(Respondent Don's Meats Opening Brief at 2). That is grossly inaccurate. The presence of Shiga 
toxin 1 and 2 in the broth obtained from the meat establishes the portion of meat harbored E. coli 
somewhere within the larger sample. Finding Shiga toxin 1 and 2 is like finding a fingerprint-by 
finding a fingerprint, it follows that a human hand touched the surface. If Shiga toxins are detected, 
Shiga toxin producing E. coli necessarily produced them. Arguing that because no bacterium were 
isolated, no bacteria were present in the sample is like arguing despite finding a fingerprint, 
humans had never been there. 
The only evidence produced implicates the adulterated, uninspected meat Don's Meats 
admits to processing and selling caused the severe illnesses of the Deiter family. Accordingly, at 
a minimum, this question would be appropriate for a fact-finder to determine, and not disposed of 
on summary judgment. 
VI. ATTORNEY'S FEES 
This appeal was brought with the sound backing of the law and the record. It is certainly 
not frivolous or unreasonable. Accordingly, no attorney's fees or costs for the Respondents are 
appropriate under the law. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ms. Anderson and Don's Meats violated the FMlA in their sale and processing of 
uninspected, adulterated meat. These violations constitute actionable negligence under Idaho law. 
The Deiters respectfully request this court reverse the grants of summary judgment to Respondents 
and remand the case for trial on the merits. 
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Patrick E. Mahoney (#ISB #5242) 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
420 W. Main Street, #206 




Elliot L. Olsen (MN ID #203750) 
Ryan M. Osterholm (MN ID# 390152) 
Admitted Pro Hae Vice 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Suite 2950 Plaza Seven 
45 South 7th Street 
Minneapolis, MN 55402-1652 
(612) 338-0202 
13 
